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Does Better Environmental Performance
Affect Revenues, Costs, or Both?
Evidence from a Transition Economy
Abstract: This study analyzes the effect of corporate environmental performance on financial
performance in a transition economy.  In particular, it assesses whether good environmental
performance affects revenues, costs, or both, and if so, in which directions.  As environmental
performance improves, do revenues rise and costs fall so that profits unambiguously increase?  Or
vice versa?  If both revenuesandcostsrise(orfall), does better environmental performance improve
or undermine profitability?  To answer these questions, our study analyzes the links from
environmental performance to revenues, costs, and profits using an unbalanced panel of Czech firms
from the years 1996 to 1998.  The analytical results indicate strongly that better environmental
performance improves profitability by driving down costs more than it drives down revenues,
consistent with the substantial regulatory scrutiny exerted by environmental agencies and the primary
pollution control approach implemented by firms during the sample period.
JEL codes: D21, G39, Q53
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Non-Technical Summary
This paper analyzes the effect of corporate environmental performance on financial
performance in a transition economy.  Theoretical insight on this topic posits either a positive
relationship or a negative relationship.  The traditional perspective views environmental
expenditures, whether onend-of-pipetreatmentorpollutionprevention efforts, as a drain on firms’
resources.  On the other hand, more recent theoretical insight posits that pollution prevention and
the associated re-evaluation of firms’ production processes engenders opportunities for firms to
innovate by modifying their production “strategically”, such as recycling by-products that would
otherwise be discharged into the natural environment.
Several studies analyze empirically the effect of corporate environmental performance on
financial performance but only in mature market economies.  In contrast, our study examines the
effect of environmental performance, as measured by air pollutant emissions, on financial
performance inthetransitioneconomyoftheCzechRepublicbetween1996and1998.  The context
of a transition economy is highlyinterestingfor an assessment of financial performance for obvious
reasons.  Firms in transitioneconomies are struggling to restructure themselves within a new market-
based system. De novo private firms struggle to establish themselves as the economic system
evolves.  State-owned firms struggle to compete against potentially more nimble private competitors.
Privatized firms (i.e., previously state-owned) face the extra challenge of reformulating their
corporate management practices to fit a new economic paradigm.  The importance of corporate
restructuring and financial management is even greater in most of the transition economies in Central
and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic, given the desire to enter the European Union.
As with many of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the context of the Czech4
transition economy is also highly interesting for an assessment of environmental performance.
During and following the collapse of communism in the Czech Republic, environmental protection
issues were prominent.  In addition to domestic concerns, the Czech government needed to reduce
industrial air pollutant emissions to qualify for membership in the EU.  Between 1991 and 1998, the
country’s government tightened air protection with a new Clean Air Act and steadily increased
emission charge rates on all stationary emission sources.  Thus, Czech firms simultaneously
struggled to control their air pollutant emissions and re-organize their financial matters.
Overall, our study of the Czech Republic may be viewed as representative of other countries
in the Central and Eastern European region during their transition periods towards EU accession.
Within the context of a transition economy, our study focuses on a particular research
question. It assesses whether good environmental performance affects revenues, costs, or both,  and
if so, in which directions.  As environmental performance improves, do revenues rise or fall?  Do
costs rise or fall?  Do revenues rise and costs fall so that profits unambiguously increase?  Or do
revenues fall and costs rise so that profits unambiguouslydecrease?  If both revenues and costs rise
(or fall), does better environmental performance improve or undermine profitability?  To answer
these questions, this study analyzes the links from environmental performance to revenues, costs,
and profits using an unbalanced panel of Czech firms from the years 1996 to 1998.  The analytical
results indicate stronglyand robustlythat better environmental performance improves profitability
by driving down costs more than it drives down revenues, consistent with the substantial regulatory
scrutiny exerted by Czech environmental agencies and the primary pollution control approach
implemented by Czech firms during the sample period.5
1. Introduction
Much recent economic analysis, including empirical studies, examines the effect of corporate
environmental performance on financial performance (e.g., Konar and Cohen, 2001; Khanna and
Damon, 1999).  Theoretical insight on this topic posits either a positive relationship or a negative
relationship.  The traditional perspective views environmental expenditures, whether on end-of-pipe
treatment or pollution prevention efforts, as a drain on firms’ resources(Palmer et al., 1995; Filbeck
and Gorman, 2004).  Certainly, firms spend billions of dollars annually when applying for
environmental permits, installing mandatory technologies or at least technologies necessary to
achieve compliance with pollution limits, and reporting their environmental impacts (Portney and
Stavins, 2000).    For example, in 1994, U.S. firms spent more than $ 120 billion to comply with
environmental laws, in addition to several more billions spent on associated research and
development (Konar and Cohen, 2001).
On the other hand, more recent theoretical insight posits that pollution prevention and the
associated re-evaluation of firms’ production processes engenders opportunities for firms to innovate
by modifying their production “strategically”, such as recycling by-products that would otherwise
be discharged into the natural environment (Filbeck and Gorman, 2004).  Moreover, this innovation
may translate into a competitive advantage for a firm (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).  Consistent
with this perspective, some firms are moving beyond compliance by voluntarily reducing their
pollution to levels below legal limits (Konar and Cohen,2001). In some cases, this overcompliance
is associated with a government-sponsored voluntary program. Forexample,more than 1,200 firms
participated in the EPA’s 33/50 program, agreeing to reduce voluntarily their emissions of certain
chemicals by 33 % by 1988 and by 50 % by 1995 (Arora and Cason, 1995).  Similar to voluntary6
overcompliance or as part of these efforts to overcomply, some firms are adopting riskier proactive
environmental management practices that attempt to modify production processes in order to prevent
pollution rather than treat it. While riskier, these pollution prevention programs may effectively
reduce pollution, while also lowering costs. For example, by implementing a rigorous pollution
prevention program, 3M reported reducing its air pollutant emissions by 125,000 tons between 1975-
1990, while saving more than $ 1 billion in costs (McCloskey, 1993).
Several studies analyze empirically the effect of corporate environmental performance on
financial performance (e.g., Khanna and Damon, 1999).  To the authors’ best knowledge, no
previous study examines this relationship outside of the US and Canada, with only two studies of
Canada (Laplante andLanoie,1994; Lanoieetal.,1998). Thus, previous empirical studies examine
only mature market economies.  In contrast, our study examines the effect of environmental
performance, as measured by air pollutant emissions, on financial performance in the transition
economy of the Czech Republic during the years 1996 and 1998.
The context of a transition economy is highly interesting for an assessment of financial
performance for obvious reasons.  Firms in transition economies are struggling to restructure
themselves within a new market-based system. De novo private firms struggle to establish
themselves as the economic system evolves.  State-owned firms struggle to compete against
potentially more nimble private competitors.  Privatized firms (i.e., previously state-owned firms)
face the extrachallenge of reformulatingtheir corporatemanagement practicestofitan entirely new
economic paradigm. The importance of corporate restructuring and financial management is even
greater in most of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech
Republic, given the desire to enter the European Union (EU). [While the Czech Republic entered7
the EU in 2004, the accession process began in the mid-1990s.]
As with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the context of the Czech transition
economy is also highly interesting for an assessment of environmental performance.  During and
following the collapse of communism in the Czech Republic, environmental protection issues were
prominent.  The Czech Republic had a substantially degraded environment in the 1990s; in
particular, poor ambient air quality and air pollution were large environmental problems of public
concern (World Bank, 1992). In addition to this domestic public concern, the Czech government
needed to reduce industrial air pollutant emissions in order to qualify for membership in the EU.
(For both of these reasons, our focus on air-related environmental performance seems quite valid.)
In response to public concern and in anticipation of the Czech Republic’s entrance into the EU,
between 1991 and 1998, the country’s government was tightening air protection with a new Clean
Air Act and its subsequent clarifying decrees. The Czech government was requiring new stationary
emission sources to meet stringent emission limits based on the installation of state-of-the-art
treatment technologies and forcing existing stationaryemission sources initially to meet “currently
attainable” emission limits and eventuallyto meet new source limits (by the end of 1998), all while
steadily increasing emission charge rates on all stationary emission sources.  In addition to more
stringent air protection policies, Czechfirmsmovedinto exportmarkets that may have offered new,
albeit limited, opportunities to market “green” goods.  Consistent with the escalating protection
policies and new marketing opportunities, investment in environmental protection as a percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) rose dramatically after 1991, peaking in 1996, and declined
substantially after 1998, returning to pre-transition levels by 2000.  In keeping with this increased
investment, throughout this same period, aggregate air pollutant emissions declined dramatically.During this period, the Czech government offered limited financial assistance from the State
1
Environmental Fund for environmental investment.  For example, this sourcerepresented only 4 % and 9 %
of overall financing into air-related investment in 1996 and 1997, respectively (Czech Ministry of the
Environment, 1997, 1998).
While greater variation in the financial and environmental performance factors help to facilitate
2
ouranalysis,this greater variation may stem (at least partially) from a stronger prevalenceof “noise”, which
reduces our analytical ability to identify a meaningful “signal”.
  Details on this comparison are available upon request.
3
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Thus, Czech firms substantially increased their investment into environmental protection and
produced dramatic pollution reductions.
1
Consequently, Czech firms simultaneouslystruggled to control their air pollutant emissions
and re-organize their financialmatters. In this context of major changes, we anticipate that our study
is well-positioned to capture any meaningful relationship that might exist between environmental
and financial performance.  This context contrasts with a mature market economy, where most firms
may only marginally modify their environmental management practices with only limited effects on
their financial performance. Of course, many prominent cases of substantial change to
environmental management do exist in mature market economies; however, these cases need not
represent a substantial portion of the overall economy.
2
For this reason, the results from this study of a transition economy need not generalize to
economies that are neither in transition or developing in general. Nevertheless, the results should
generalize to other similar transition economies.  The Czech experience with poor ambient air
quality, initially high air pollutant emission levels, tightened air protection laws, substantial emission
reductions, and pending entry into the EU is highly similar to other countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, such as Hungary and Poland.   Thus, our study of the Czech Republic may be viewed as
3
representative of other countries in the Central and Eastern European region during its transition9
period towards EU accession.  In sum, this study cannot serve as the definitive study on the link from
environmental performance to financial performance and may not generalize beyond transition
economies; still, it represents a useful contribution to a literature packed with studies of mature
market economies.
Within the context of a transition economy, our study focuses on a particular research
question.  It assesses whether good environmental performance affects revenues, costs, or both,  and
if so, in which directions. As environmental performance improves, do revenues rise or fall?  Do
costs rise or fall?  Do revenues rise and costs fall so that profits unambiguously increase?  Or do
revenues fall and costs rise so that profits unambiguously decrease? If both revenues and costs rise
(or fall), does better environmental performance improve or undermine profitability?  To answer
these questions, this study analyzes the links from environmental performance to revenues, costs,
and profits using a panel of Czech firms. The analytical results indicate strongly and robustly that
better environmentalperformanceimprovesprofitabilityby driving down costs more than revenues.
This paper explores the effect of environmental performance within the following format.
The next section summarizes the related literature.  Section 3 describes the database on corporate
financial performance and air pollutant emissions.  Section 4 estimates and interprets the effect of
corporate environmental performance on financial performance. The final section concludes.
2. Related Literature and Theoretical Insight
2.1. Literature of the Link from Environmental Performance to Financial Success
Recent economic analysis explores the link from corporate environmental performance to
financial performance.  All of these studies analyzefirmsinmature market economies. Four studies
employ regression analysis to examine a sample of firms from the Standard & Poor 500 using  Sales-adjusted excess market value equals actual market value less the book value of assets.
4
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environmental data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) Corporate
Environmental Profiles Directory.  First, Konar and Cohen (2001) find asignificantly positive effect
of good environmental performance, as measured by toxic emissions, on firms’ intangible asset
values.  Similarly, Austin et al. (1999) demonstrate that good environmental performance, as
captured by certain measures (e.g., toxic emissions and hazardous waste corrective actions),
positively affect financial rates of return.  Consistent with the two noted studies, Hart and Ahuja
(1996) show that emission reductions prompt better financial performance, based on
accounting-based measures, within a two-year window.  Filbeck and Gorman (2004) also find a
positive relationship between financial and environmental performance; to demonstrate this point,
they regress three-year holding period returns against environmental penalty magnitudes.
Three additional studies generate similar conclusions in general by also employing regression
analysis to examine financial performance.  Russo and Fouts (1997) demonstrate that good
environmental ratings, as assigned by the Franklin Research and Development Corporation,
positively impact a firm’s return on assets (ROA).  Khanna and Damon (1999) generate a similar
conclusion by examining participants in the EPA’s 33/50 program and revealing that better
environmental performance, at least measured by the number of Superfund sites, improves return
on investment and sales-adjusted excess market value.   In addition, the authors show that
4
participationinthe 33/50 program improves sales-adjusted excess market value.  Similar to Khanna
and Damon (1999), Arora and Cason (1996) demonstrate that participation in the EPA’s 33/50
program slightly increases profits.
In addition to regression analysis, which our study employs, three studies use sample meansAdditionalstudiesuseevent-study analysis to examine the effect of environmental events on stock
5
value.  Laplante and Lanoie (1994) use the CAPM version of event-study analysis.  Bosch et al. (1998) use
Dodd and Warner’s (1983) version of event-study analysis to explore the effect of federal environmental
enforcement on stockholder wealth. They show that the stock market reacts negatively upon learning that
a given firm has been targeted forenforcement. Muoghaluetal.(1990)alsouseDodd and Warner’s (1983)
version of event-study analysis.  Lanoie et al. (1998) use a method akin to event-study analysis to analyze
how investors react to thereleaseofpublicinformationregardingtheenvironmental performance ofspecific
facilities, including the deliberate release by regulators, as measured by fluctuations on the stock market.
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) use the Efficient Market Theory version of event-study analysis to show
that signals of strong environmental management, as measured by environmental performance awards,
increase firms’ equity returns, and signals of weak environmental management, as measured by
environmental “crises”, lower equity returns. Hamilton (1995) uses Dodd and Warner’s (1983) version of
event-study analysis to examine firms listed in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’sToxic Release
Inventory (TRI) database to determine the effect of that data’s release on stockreturns for those firms.  His
results indicate that stockholders in firms reportingTRIpollution figures experienced negatively abnormal
returns upon the first release of theinformation. In additionto their event-study analysis, both Klassen and
McLaughlin (1996) and Hamilton (1995) perform regression analysis.  In particular, Hamilton (1995)
performs cross-sectionanalysis of theabnormalreturns,measuredindollars,onthedayof TRI data release.
Konar and Cohen (1997) also use event-study analysis to examine investors’ reactions to the release of TRI
data.  Then they expandon Hamilton(1995)byshowing that theabnormal returns generated by theTRI data
release were important enough to affect future corporate environmental performance.
11
tests to examine the effect of environmental performance on financial performance.  First, Cohen
et al. (1995) examine both accounting-based measures of financial performance (e.g., return on
assets) and market-based measures of financial performance (e.g., risk-adjusted shareholder total
return).  Their study divides a sample of US firms into two “portfolios” according to whether each
firm is above or below its industry median for one of nine environmental performance measures.
Then they test the differences in financial performance mean values across the two sub-samples.
Similarly, Austin et al. (1999) divide firms into “green” and “brown” categories according to their
lagged environmental performance.  Consistent with these two studies, Gottsman and Kessler (1998)
compare the financial returns to the S&P 500 against three sub-samples based on four measures of
environmental performance.  In particular, they divide firms into the top 75%, top 50%, and top 25%
of environmental performers across all industries.
5
Our study draws upon this empirical literature to guide our analysis. Since all of the noted12
studies examine mature market economies, our study contributes to the literature by examining the
link from corporate environmental performance to financial performance in a transition economy.
As a second contribution, our study examines a panel of firms over a multi-year period using
an econometric estimator that relies upon intra-firm variation rather than cross-sectional variation.
Use of this estimator avoids the concern that more financially successful firms are the same ones
who effectively control their pollution levels.  Several of the previous studies fail to address this
concern (e.g., Russo and Fouts, 1997; Hart and Ahuja, 1996; Arora and Cason, 1996).
Consequently, these studies may be incorrectly attributing influenceto environmental performance
that is based on correlationratherthancausation.  In other words, these cross-sectional analyses are
unable to identify properly the important heterogeneity across firms, while our panel data analysis
controls for individual firm characteristics in more detail.
Beyond the empirical guidance displayed above, the cited studies, along with additional
studies, provide insight into the theoretical effect of environmental performance on financial
performance.  Collectively, this insight suggests that good environmental performance may improve
or degrade financial success and that this improvement or degradation may stem from an alteration
to revenues, costs, or both.
First, environmental performance may affect revenues. Customers may be willing to pay
more for orbuymoreofenvironmentallyfriendly products ( “green” products).  Thus, a firm is able
to increase its revenues by reducing its environmental impact in order to sell “green” products
(Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  Conversely, firms may experience lower revenues when their
products are deemed “brown” because the firms’ environmental record is poor.  Within the realm
of “green” marketing, a firm may sell green products to customers who would otherwise be13
indifferent to the firm’s environmentally responsible efforts (Konar and Cohen, 2001). In addition,
environmentally responsible behavior may improve a firm’s overall reputation among customers
(McGuire et al., 1988). Lastly, a firm may be able to increase its revenues by using an
environmentally friendly technology to establish an industry standard; this establishment provides
the firm with an “early-mover advantage” and status as an “industry leader” (Hart and Ahuja, 1996;
Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Porter and van der Linde, 1995).  All of these noted effects are
causal, in that better environmental performance directlyleadsto higher revenues, given a sufficient
lag.  For example, customers need time to assess the “green” nature of a product before modifying
their willingness to pay for it.
Second, environmental performance may affect costs.  When firms invest in more efficient
production processes, frequentlythesenewtechnologiesarealso environmentally friendly: the new
production processes require less energy, generate less waste, demand fewer toxic inputs, etc.  In
addition, better environmental performance maylower the costs of regulatory scrutiny, such as lost
productivity due to inspections.  Similarly, it may lower the costs associated with regulatory
sanctions and third-party lawsuits (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  Similar to regulatory scrutiny,
better environmental performance may lower the costs imposed by local community pressure, e.g.,
increased zoning restrictions (Earnhart, 2004; Konar and Cohen, 2001).  Related to regulatory
sanctions and third-party lawsuits, better environmental performance may reduce financing costs
because  lenders associate lower financial risk with better environmental management (McGuire et
al., 1988).  These environmental effects on costs are causal: better environmental performance
directly leads to less regulatory scrutiny, fewer sanctions, less community pressure, etc, given aTheinstallationof a newly efficient process may be a notable exception since installation generates
6
twooutcomes: (1) lower costs, and(2) better environmental performance.  In this case, better environmental
performanceneednot causelower costs. Instead, a link may simply exist betweenthe two elements because
they stem from thesameunderlyingcause. However, theeffect ofenvironmental performance onlower costs
may be viewed as causal when a firm chooses to improve its environmental performance by installing a
newly efficient productionprocess.  Inthis case, the choice to improve environmental performance leads to
lower costs.
14
sufficient lag.   For example, regulators needs time to respond to poor environmental performance
6
with inspections and sanctions; consistent with this separation in time, improved environmental
performance will lower a firm’s future regulatory costs.
Better environmental performance may also reduce labor costs.  Pollution-reduction
investments may lower three types of emissions: (1) “external emissions”, which are directly
discharged from the factory into the external environment, (2) “internal emissions”, which are
created and remain within a factory’s working environment, and (3) “internal/external emissions”,
which are created within a factory’s working environmental but are eventually discharged into the
external environment.  (These internal/external emissions are important when a facility’s primary
emission sources are diffuse within the factory; wood chip dust represents a good example of these
so called “fugitive emissions”.)  Often, if a factory wishes to lower its overall discharges into the
external environment, it must reduce internal/external emissions.  Reductions in internal/external
emissions improve working conditions, which increases labor productivity (lowering labor costs)
and decreases worker’s compensation claims and litigation costs (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
Thus, efforts to improve environmental performance – lower discharges into the external
environment – directly lead to lower costs, due to better working conditions.  Still, this causal link
exists with a lag since the human body does not respond immediately to improved indoor ambient
air quality and the compensation claims process is time-consuming.15
In contrast to these enhancementsto cost minimization, complex pollution-reducing devices
and processes may reduce overall productive efficiency, thus, raising production costs(Boschet al.,
1998). This effect is causal and consistent with the traditional perspective on pollution control,
which views efforts to reduce emissions,whetherwithend-of-pipe treatment or pollution prevention
methods, as a real drain on firm resources (Palmer et al., 1995; Filbeck and Gorman, 2004).
Third, environmental performance may affectboth revenues and costs.  From a more general
perspective, investments in environmentally responsible behavior may drag down financial
performance because resources are being committed to an ostensibly non-productive use (Cohen et
al., 1995).  More specifically, environmentally responsible business decisions may limit a firm’s
strategic alternatives, thus, driving down revenues and driving up costs. For example, a firm may
decide not to pursue certain product lines or avoid plant relocations and investment opportunities
in certain locations (McGuire et al., 1988).
Consistent with this classification, several studies in the literature take great pains to
distinguish conceptually the two relevant pathways from environmental performance to financial
performance: (1) the pathway of revenues and (2) the pathway of costs.  For example, Figure 2 of
Klassen and McLaughlin (1996, p. 1202) represents an excellent schematic for distinguishing
between “market gains” and “cost savings”. Despite these efforts, no previous empirical study
evaluatesthetwopathways,to the authors’ best knowledge.  Instead, the previous empirical studies
examine either market-basedfinancial performancemeasures, whichcannotdiscernrevenues from
costs, or profit-based accounting measures, which evaluate only the difference between revenues and
costs.  Thus, the present study contributes to the literature by evaluating both profit and its
constituent components in order to assess effectively the two noted pathways.16
Lastly, we draw upon the noted theoretical insight to interpret our empirical results.
2.2. Literature of Financial Performance in Central and Eastern Europe
We also draw upon recent economic studies of corporate financial and operational
performance in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  None of these studies
consider environmental performance as an explanatory variable.  Moreover, the prominent economic
studies use a surprisingly narrow set of measures to capture corporate financial performance.  In
particular, they consider only accounting-based measures of financial performance. In contrast to
studies of financial performance in the US and Canada, few studies of the Central and Eastern
European region consider market-based measures for examining corporate-level financial
performance across a variety of firms; this limited use is not surprising given the weakly developed
state of most of the stock markets in this region during the 1990s.
We describe the use of financial and operating performance measures by a few of the more
prominent studies.  Frydman et al. (1999) use revenues and the ratio of labor and material costs to
revenues.  Both Kocenda and Svejnar (2002) and Pohl et al. (1997) use profitability.  Similarly,
Claessens and Djankov (1999) use profitability defined as operating profits relative to the sum of
fixed assets and inventory. Weiss and Nikitin (2002) use operating profit and value added on either
a per worker basis or a per capital unit basis.  We utilize these studies to identify meaningful
measures of corporate financial performance in the context of a transition economy.
We also utilize these studies to identify controlfactorsin the context of a transition economy.
All of these cited studies include only three types of control factors: ownership structure, year
indicators, and industrial sector indicators.  Claessens and Djankov (1999) include a dummy variable
for the first phase of privatization in the Czech Republic, which does not relate to air pollution  Further details on country-wide emissions, Czech air regulations, and environmental issues related
7
to EU accession are available upon request.
17
controls.  Multi-countrystudiesalsoinclude country-specific indicators (e.g.,Frydman et al., 1999).
We include the same relevant control factors as these cited studies, in addition to other factors.
3. Data on Financial and Environmental Performance
3.1. Czech Republic as Study Site
Toexaminethe effectof corporate environmental performance on financial performance, we
exploit data on firms in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 1998, which is an excellent site and
time period for our study.  First, poor ambient air qualitywas a prominent environmental problem.
In response to public concern, Czech government authorities took substantial and effective steps to
decrease air emissions dramatically during the period 1991 to 1998 (Czech Ministry of Environment,
1998).  Figure 1 displays the trend of economy-wide air emissions over this period.  Perhaps, the
post-communist decline in economic activity partially explains the drop in the early 1990s.  This
output decline notwithstanding, firms’ pollution control efforts, such as the installation of
electrostatic precipitators (“scrubbers”) and fuel switching may also explain much of the reduction
in air pollutant emissions (World Bank, 1999).  Second, consistent with this focus on pollution
control efforts, investment in environmental protection was most important during the period
between 1992 and 1998, as shown in Figure 2.  As a percentage of Czech gross domestic product
(GDP), investment rose dramatically after 1991 from a level of 1.3 % to a peak of 2.5 % in 1997 and
tailed off after 1998 back to apre-transition levelof1.1 %by 2000; in 1990, investment was 1.1. %
of GDP.   Third, the Czech Republic was attempting to enter the EU during this period and was
required to reduce its industrial emissions in order to qualify for membership.
7  These financial data are not adjusted for inflation. Instead, our analysis includes year indicators
8
as regressors in the regression analysis.
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3.2. Panel Data from Financial Statements, Ownership Files, and Emissions Register
To examine accounting-based financial performance at Czech enterprises, we gather data
from three segments of a database provided by the private data vendor Aspekt. Two segments
provide information drawn from firms’ balance sheets, such as assets, and information taken from
firms’ income statements, such as profits.   The third segment provides information on ownership
8
structure, which we use as a control variable in our multivariate regression analysis.  We gather
balance sheet and income statementdata and ownership data for the years 1996 to 1998.  The Aspekt
database includes all firms traded on the primary market – Prague Stock Exchange – or secondary
market [e.g.,“Registraní místo system”(RMS)] andamajorityoftheremaining large Czech firms
(plus their key trading partners).  This comprehensive database has been used by previous studies
of financialandoperational performancein theCzechRepublic(e.g.,Claessens and Djankov, 1999;
Weiss and Nikitin, 2002; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Djankov, 1999).
As an indicator of corporate environmental performance, we choose air pollutants emitted
by facilities located in theCzech Republicduringtheyears1995 and 1998. The included pollutants
2x are carbon monoxide (CO), sulfurdioxide (SO ), particulate matter, and nitrous oxides (NO ), which
represent the main and most heavily regulated pollutants in the Czech Republic, similar to other
industrialized nations. The Czech HydrometeorologicalInstitute maintains the REZZO-1 database,
which records emissions for large, stationary sources.  While the REZZO-1 database records
emissions at individual units of individual facilities, the Czech Hydrometeorological Institute
aggregates the air emissions to the level of each facilitybefore public releaseof the data. We further  While the CzechHydrometeorological Institutegathersadditionalinformationonsome facilities,
9
these data are not systematically recorded.
  In the case of emissions, non-missing data are available for either all four pollutants or none.
10
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aggregate air emissions across all facilities associated with a single firm, especially since no other
facility-level dataareavailableto us.  Thus, the analysis links emissions data aggregated to the firm
9
level with other firm-level data, consistent with previous studies of firm-level environmental
performance (Konar and Cohen, 1997; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Earnhart and Lizal, 2006; Khanna
and Damon, 1999; Khanna et al., 1998; Arora and Cason, 1995). Finally, we add the four pollutants
into one composite measure of air emissions, similar to previous studies of environmental
performance (Konar and Cohen,1997;Konarand Cohen, 2001; Khanna and Damon, 1999; Khanna
et al., 1998; Arora and Cason, 1995; Arora and Cason, 1996).
To examine the effect of environmental performance on financial performance, while
controlling for ownership structure, we merge the financial, emission, and ownership data sets.  In
order to generate the largest sample possible and to avoid a sample selection biasdue to attrition, we
create an unbalanced panel of firm-year observations for the time period 1996 to 1998. In this
merger and creation, we screen for meaningful financial data by applying the following criteria:
positive production, positive total assets, and positive fixed assets.  (Other important financial
measures, such as profits, are difficult to screen because they can truthfully take zero or negative
values.)  We also restrict our sample to those observations with non-missing data for the financial,
ownership, and emission variables used in our analysis.   We consider three financial performance
10
measures; each retained observation must possess non-missing data for all three measures.  (We
choose not to examine a variety of samples based on the availability of data for each financial  Two features of this merger deserve elaboration.  First, the overlap between thefinancialdata set
11
and the air emissions data set is limited.  Yet, the limited overlap does not indicate a problem with the data.
Instead, it may simply indicate that firms included in the Aspekt database do not own large stationary air
emission sources. In this way, the Aspekt database need not completely represent large stationary air
polluters. Therefore, our results maynotgeneralizetoallormostlargestationaryairpolluters. Theopposite
concern is not relevant. The REZZO-1 database is fully comprehensive of all large polluters.
Second, the restrictionof non-missing data binds strongly for ownership data because we lack these
data for many firm-year observations.  (Ownership data for years prior to 1996are especially scarce, which
explains our focus on the period1996to1998. Inaddition,dataonownershippriorto1996mostly exist for
firmsthatwereprivatized under theCzechcitizen voucher program; thus, use ofthesedata most likely would
introduce sample selection bias.)  The incomplete recording of ownership data during the chosen sample
periodraises a concernabout selection bias. We address this concernby implementing a Heckman two-step
sample selection procedure (Heckman, 1979). Based on the first stage of this procedure, we generate an
inverse Mills ratio for each firm in each time period.  By including this variable as a regressor in the
estimation of financial performance, we control for any potential sample selection bias. (Complete details
are available upon request.)
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performance measure; byconsideringa single sample, we avoid sample compositional biases when
comparing results across the various financial performance measures. The same concern applies to
our use of various measures of firm size; again, we avoid compositional biases by considering a
single sample.) This merger, screening, and set of restrictions generates a combined unbalanced
panel of 429 firms with 1,044 observations for the years 1996 to 1998.  (In this process, missing
values, not inconsistent values, cause most of the reduction in sample size.)
11
3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents a statistical summaryof the relevant firm data. As shown in Table 1.a, our
data are sufficiently spreadacrossthethreeyears of our time frame.  Table 1.b. summarizes our data
on air emissions.Ourdatasetcontainsmuchvariation for emissions, which facilitates our analysis.
Table 1.b also summarizes the ownership shares held by certain types of investors: (1) state, (2)
investment funds, (3) citizens, (4) portfolio companies, (5) bank: direct ownership, (6) strategic
investors (e.g., other companies), (7) foreign investors, and (8) dispersed private investors, which  Two of these ownership forms deserve elaboration. First, portfolio companies are similar to
12
strategicinvestorsinthatanothercompanyinvestsinthe identified company; however, the rationale for the
investment ranges widely.  Second, the category of dispersed investorsincludes investorswho hold less than
10% of a given company and never publicly announced their holdings.  Since data on these shares are not
available, we cannot measure the presence of dispersed investors directly. Instead, we establish it as the
omitted category in ourregressionanalysis. As a benchmark, these investors clearly represent less interested,
non-strategic investors since they hold such a small share of the particular company.
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are not included in the table.   We also incorporate a variable to capture the concentration of
12
ownership as measured by the stockholding share of the single largest shareholder (Kocenda and
Svejnar, 2002).
Table 1.d indicates the distribution of firms by industrial classification, while Table 1.c
summarizes the key financial variables used in our study: profits, operating profits, sales (or
revenues), costs, total assets, and equity. As demonstrated bythe standard deviation measures, our
data set contains much variation in these financial measures.
Profits, operating profits, sales, and costs represent measures of accounting-based financial
performance.  In particular, profits and operating profits represent two measures of profitability.
Operating profits equal the difference between sales and the combination of costs of goods sold and
operating expenses,such as depreciation.  Profits equal the difference between operating profits and
otherincomeandexpenses, such as interest payments, extraordinary gains, and taxes.  Interestingly,
profits andoperatingprofitsarenot extremelycorrelated given a correlation coefficient () equal to
0.709, which is statisticallysignificant (p=0.0001). Since the two profitability measures are similar
but sufficientlydifferent, as a robustness check, we examine both profits and operating profits.  For
the purposes of this study, costs represent the difference between sales and profits.  Consequently,
they do not capture full costs but full costs net of other income; i.e., [cost of goods sold + operating
costs + other costs] - other income.22
Total assets and equity representmeasuresof firm size.  While total assets and equity capture
distinctively different aspects of a firm’s financial structure,the two measures are strongly correlated
( = 0.939) and significantly correlated (p=0.0001).  Thus, both measures are most likely capturing
similar information about a firm’ssize. Yet, as a check for robustness,weconsider both measures.
4. Statistical Analysis of Financial Performance
4.1. Econometric Framework
In this section, we use the described data to explore the link from environmental to financial
performance at Czech firms in 1996 to 1998.  We estimate the relationship between environmental
performance, as measured by the absolute level of air pollutant emissions, and financial performance,
as measured by sales, costs, and profits. Consistent withseveral previous studies(Konar and Cohen,
2001; Filbeck and Gorman, 2004; Cohen et al., 1995; Austin et al., 1999;Hartand Ahuja, 1996), we
use lagged environmental performance as the proper regressor.  The lagging of environmental
performance is appropriate since economic agents need to time to translate any reduction in
emissions into an alteration of revenues and/or costs, as noted in sub-section 2.1.  For example,
consumers need time to view a product as “green”; as another example, lenders need time to adjust
their calculations of environmental risk.  Thus, environmental performance and financial
performance are separated in time.  Given this separation, lagged environmental performance is
clearly predetermined with respect to current financial performance.  In essence, the analysis
estimates the effect of environmental performance on future financial performance.
To estimate the influence of environmental performance on financial performance, we regress
each type of financial performance on lagged air pollutant emissions plus other control factors.  To
construct the econometric models associated with financial performance, we define the following23
it notation. Weconsider three dependent variables. As the first dependent variable,s  denotes the sales
it generated by firmi in time period t. As the second dependent variable, c  denotes the costs born by
it firm i in time period t.  Finally,   denotes the profits generated by firm i in time period t.  Unless
it otherwise indicated,   denotes overall profits as opposed to operating profits.
The analysis seeks to decompose the effect of each explanatory factor on profits into the
factor’s separate effect on revenues and separate effect on costs.  Estimation of profits unto itself
does not provide this decomposition.  Estimating revenues and costs separately, along with
estimation of profits, would generate this decomposition. Fortunately, we do not need to estimate
all three dependent variables. Bydefinition, profits equal the difference between revenues and costs.
Thus, we onlyneedto estimate two ofthethree dependent variables in order to generate the desired
decomposition.  Each coefficient that could be generated by estimation of the omitted dependent
variable is recoverable as a simple linear combination of the coefficients generated for the two
estimated dependent variables.  Arbitrarily, we choose to estimate costs and profits.  Based on the
coefficients generated by the estimation of costs and profits, we recover the estimated coefficients
for revenues.  For each regressor, the sales-related coefficient equals the difference between the
profit-related coefficient and the cost-related coefficient; we elaborate below.
We incorporate various explanatoryvariablesinto ourestimation of costs and profits.  As the
i,t-1 primary explanatory variable,p denotes the amount of pollution emitted by firmi in the preceding
time period t-1 (i.e., lagged emissions).  We also include financially-related factors as explanatory
it variables.  Costs and profits most likely depend on the level of production, which is denoted as y .
As production rises, one would expect costs to rise. Since production is clearly expected to affect  Two aspects surrounding production deserve elaboration. First, productionis measured in value
13
terms, which allows the analysis to compare across firms and across time within a given firm. As noted
below, our analysis incorporates both industry-specific indicators (or firm-specific indicators in the fixed
effects model)andyear indicators. This incorporation sufficiently controls for any variationin prices across
firms and/or time that may otherwise complicatetheuseofproductionvalueasaregressor. Second, for our
analysis, weassumethat productionis pre-determined withrespect tocostsandprofits.  Consistent withthis
generalassumption,wespecificallyassumethatthefirmisaprice-taker,eveninthosecaseswhenit markets
a productof higher environmental quality. Similarly, we assume that the firmis demand-constrained in each
separateproduct, with a clear distinctionbetweena productofhigherenvironmentalqualityandoneof lower
environmental quality.  Fortunately, identifying the relationship between production and costs and profits
does not prove critical for the task at hand.  The reported results regarding the effect of environmental
performance on financial performance are fully robust to the exclusion of the production factor and a one-
year lagging of the production factor.
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costs, by extension, production is expected to affect profits.    Costs and profits may also depend
13
it on firm size, denoted as a . Unless otherwise indicated, firm size is captured by total assets.  This
set of financially-related regressors may seem limited relative to the regressor sets used by
comparable studies of environmental and financial performance in mature market economies.  These
studies include additional regressors, such as advertising expenditures and research and development
expenditures.  We do not include these types of factors as regressors for two reasons.  First, as noted
in Section 2, previous studies of corporate financial performance in transition economies do not
include these types of factors. Second, data on these factors are not recorded systematically, if at all,
in our database.
Our analysis incorporates additional regressors.  Specifically, we includevarious regressors
that capture ownership structure.  First, we include a regressor for each ownership type except
it “dispersed investors”.  Collectively, we denote these ownership variables asW .  Second, we include
a measureofconcentration,ascapturedbytheownership shareheldbythesingle largest shareholder
t and denoted as L.  By including these ownership-related regressors, we control for ownership
structure, consistent with most studies of transition economies.  However, we neither report nor  We consider neither a semilog nor log-linear specificationbecause profits (and operating profits)
14
cannot be log-transformed since they take zero values.
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interpret the associated estimation results since ownership is not the focus of our study and the
coefficients prove insignificant.  To control for variation over time with respect to economy-wide
trends and the legal framework controlling air emissions, we also include individualyear indicators,
t collectively denoted as vector T. To control for sector-specific variation, we also include industry
i indicator variables, collectively denoted as vector X.  (The omitted industrial category includes
“manufacturing: other” and “other: overall” sectors, which are both listed in Table 1.d.)  The fixed
effects model, described below, subsumes these sectoral effects into its firm-specific fixed effects
since sector does not vary over time for a specific firm.
Given this notation, we formulate the following regression system:
it i,t-1 it it it it it it it c =  +   p +   y +  a +  W +  L +	  T +
  X +  , (1)
cc c c c c c c
it i,t-1 it it it it it it it   =   +   p +   y +  a +  W +  L +	  T +
  X +  , (2)
      
it it where   and  denotetheerrortermsassociatedwithcostsand profits, respectively.   Please note
14
the use ofsuperscriptsto distinguish thecoefficientsshown in the two equations: “c” denotes costs
and “” denotes profits.  We estimate each equation separately;jointestimationof the two equations
within a seemingly unrelated regresssion framework generates identical results since the two
regressor sets are the same.
To control properly for firm-specific effects, we estimate equations (1) and (2) using standard
panel methods: pooled OLS, fixed effects method, and random effects method.  We use standard
tests to assess these methods. When the F-test indicates significant firm-specific effects, the fixed
effects estimator dominates pooled OLS. Since this dominance always holds, we do not report the  Hausman test statistics are available upon request.
15
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pooled OLS estimates; instead, we onlyreport the F-test statistics, as shown in Tables 2 and 3.  We
use the Hausman test of random effects to evaluate whether the random effects estimates are
consistent.  Since the random effects estimates are always inconsistent based on the Hausman test
statistics, we do not report these estimates.   The fixed effects estimates are consistent by
15
assumption of the model.
Use of a fixed effects estimator has an additional advantage. By including firm-specific
intercept terms, the fixed effects estimator controls comprehensively for time-invariant factors
associated with specific firms.  Thus, the estimator controls for the possibility that companies who
are better in terms of both environmental and financial matters due to some common (time-invariant)
factor, such as a highly effective corporate governance structure. Rather than using cross-sectional
variation, which is vulnerableto this concern,the fixed effects estimator utilizes intra-firm variation.
4.2. Estimation Results
Table 2.a presents the regression results.  First, production strongly and positively affects
costs and profits.  Firm size does not significantly affect either costs or profits.
Second, we examine the estimated coefficients for lagged environmental performance.  To
recover the sales-related coefficient for environmental performance (i.e., effect of lagged
environmental performance on sales), we subtract the cost-related coefficient for environmental
performance ( ) from the profit-related coefficient for environmental performance ( ):
c 
  =   -   , (3)
s  c
where “s” denotes sales.  The resulting coefficient is shown in Table 2.b.
In this sub-section, we report and interpret briefly the estimation results relating to Details on these results are available upon request.
16
27
environmental performance, while interpreting them more deeply in the subsequent sub-section.  As
shown in Table 2.b, higherlaggedairpollutantemissionssignificantlyraisesales(p=0.062). Thus,
better environmental performance appears to reduce revenues.  Perhaps, environmentally responsible
business decisions limit firms’ strategic alternatives, forcing firms to forego revenue-boosting
products.  In contrast, better environmental performance appears linked with reduced costs.  As
shown in the first column of Table 2.a, higher lagged air pollutant emissions significantlyraise costs.
Many reasons potentiallyexplain this outcome, such as diminished regulatory scrutiny.  In the next
sub-section, we assess which of these reasons seems the most plausible.  Both reported conclusions
are fully robust to the use of equityas the firm size measure in lieu of total assets and to the inclusion
of a squared production term.
16
If better environmental performance lowers revenues and costs, one question remains: does
better environmental performance raise or lower the difference between revenues and costs, i.e.,
profits?  As shown in the second column of Table 2.a, higher lagged air pollutant emissions
significantly lower profits.  Thus, better environmental performance appears linked with improved
profitability.  While more responsible environmental management may limit firms’ abilities to
exploit revenue-enhancing projects,  apparently better environmental management more than
compensates for these missed opportunities by driving down costs via reduced regulatory scrutiny,
dampened community pressure, etc.  The next sub-section interprets the full set of results; this
interpretation helps to assess which reason (or reasons) most likely drives (or drive) these results.
We demonstrate the robustness of this last conclusion by examining the effect of
environmental performance on profitability using alternativeeconometricspecifications. We focusEstimation of the environmental performance coefficient is also robust to the inclusion of a debt
17
to equity regressor, which does not prove to be statistically significant.
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on profitabilitybecause it is the most comprehensive financial performance measure from the set of
three: sales, costs, and profits.  In all cases, the estimated effect of environmental performance on
profitability is highly robust to the alternative specifications and does not differ qualitatively across
the alternative specifications.  While we estimate several alternative specifications, which are
described below, for the sake of space and the reader’s burden, we report the full regression results
for only three alternative specifications, which are shown in Table 3. For the remaining
specifications, we merely report the p-value of the coefficient associated with environmental
performance.  First, we modify the effect of firm size on financial performance.  To capture any
it nonlinearities associated with firm size, we add a squared term of firm size (a ). As shown in the
2
first column of Table 3, this alternative specification generates an environmental performance
coefficient that is very similar in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance as the coefficient
reported in Table 2. Inclusion of the squared firm size measure causes both the linear and the
squared firm size coefficients to becomestatisticallysignificant. Specifically, profits rise with firm
size but at a decliningrate.  As an additional specification, we replace total assets with equity, as the
measure of firm size.  This change in firm size measure does not meaningfully alter the sign,
magnitude (  = -13.32), and significance (p=0.0001) of the estimated environmental performance

coefficient.  The addition of squared equity as a regressor does not change this preceding
conclusion.   Two previous studies of financial performance in Central and Eastern Europe use
17
alternative measures of firm size.  Claessens and Djankov (1999) use the sum of fixed assets and
inventory as a replacement for total assets. Similarly, Weiss and Nikitin (2002) replace total assets29
with depreciation, which serves as a proxy for units of capital.  Use of these alternative firm size
measures again generate highly similar coefficient estimates in terms of sign, magnitude, and
significance (p=0.0001 in both cases).
Second, we assess the robustness of the profits-related result by modifying the production
regressor.  In one alternative specification, we simplydrop this regressor; in a second specification,
it we lag the regressor; in a third specification, we add a squared term of production (y ).  Regardless,
2
the estimated effect of environmental performance remains strongly and significantly negative
(p=0.0001 in all cases).  Results for the third specification are displayed in the second column of
Table 3.  As shown, profits rise in production but at a declining rate since the coefficient on the
squared production term is significantly negative.
Third, we modify the measure of profitability by replacing overall profits with operating
profits.  This replacement generates a highly significant negative coefficient for lagged
environmental performance:  = - 10.92 and p = 0.0001.  Thus, better environmental performance

improves operating profitability, as well as overall profitability.  This conclusion is strongly robust
totheparticularmeasureoffirmsizeincludedasaregressor. Asshowninthethirdcolumn of Table
3, use of equity as the firm size measure also generates a highly significant negative effect
(p=0.0001) for lagged environmental performance on operating profits.  (We report the full
regression results for this particular specification since the use of equity as a firm size measure
generates a significant coefficient for firm size as opposed to the use of total assets, which generates
an insignificant coefficient for firm size.)  Use of the sum of fixed assets and inventory or
depreciation as the firm size measure generates highly similarcoefficient estimates in terms of sign,
magnitude, and significance (p=0.0001 in both cases).  According to Czech Ministry of Environment (2004), while the Czech Ministry of the
18
Environment established the National Eco-Labeling Program in 1994, this program operated at a low level
prior to 2000.  Starting in 2000, the Czech government began to support the sale of eco-labeled products by
granting them preference in the purchasing orders from the state administration.  In the same year, the
national program entered the Global Eco-Labeling Network. By 2004, the program had awarded the eco-
label to 310 products, involving 169 licenses for 82 companies; moreover, the Czech government had
integrated its national program into the multinational programs of the OECD and EU.
30
4.3. Interpretation of Results and Implications
Lastly, we interpret these results in light of the preceding literature, while attempting to
identify important implications.  First, the results of our study indicate that better environmental
performance appears to lower revenues.  This finding provides support for the conjecture that the
implementation of better environmental management practices limit firms’ abilities to pursue
revenue-enhancing projects.  More specifically, tighter air emission limits and/or higher emission
charge rates may have possibly constrained Czech firms’ abilities to produce higher quality products.
Conversely, the noted finding rejects the conjectures that better environmental management (1)
allows firms to sell “green” goods at a higher price or in greater quantity, (2) prompts customers who
are otherwise indifferent to environmentally responsible efforts to buy “green” goods, (3) improves
a firm’s overall reputation among customers, and (4) provides the firm with an “early-mover”
advantage and status as an “industryleader” (given that the better management practice establishes
an industry standard).  This apparent rejection need not surprise us given that Czech firms were
probably not well situated during the sample period to deliver “green” products or establish
themselves as “industry leaders”.
18
Overall, this finding implies that Czech firms should cautiously improve environmental
managementpracticesifcorporatemanagementkeysonanydecline in revenues, independent of any
change in profits (which seem to benefit from better environmental management), as an indicator  Use of the fixed effects estimator clarifies our interpretation of the estimated effect of
19
environmental performanceoncosts.  Given the examinationof intra-firm variation, the estimated coefficient
capturesthe connection between a change in a firm’s emissionsrelative to the firm’s average emissionlevel
and a change inthe firm’scosts relative to the firm’s average cost level.  This connection helps the analysis
to focus on the installation of new technologies.
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of the need to cut costs.  In other words, management may observe weakened revenues in the
precedingperiodandattemptto addressthis issue bycuttingcostsin thecurrent period.  In this case,
management would be over-reacting because the diminished revenues are associated with an even
stronger reduction in costs so that profits actually rise.
Second, the results of our study indicate that better environmental performance appears to
lower costs.  This finding is consistent with several conjectures, which are described in sub-section
2.1.  First, this finding supports the conjecture that implementation of a more efficient production
technology, which reduces air pollutant emissions, also lowers production costs.   Alternatively, this
19
finding supports the conjecture that reduced air emissions lead to lower regulatory scrutiny, which
reduces the costs stemming from the distraction of inspectors and lawyers.  Yet again, this finding
supports the conjecture that better environmental performance lowers the costs associated with
regulatory sanctions, third-party suits, and community pressure.
All of these interpretations are plausible for the Czech transition economy and consistent with
other available evidence.  Certainly, Czech firms invested into new production technologies over this
period (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002b). However, pollution prevention stemming from the installation
of better and cleaner productionprocesses was not prevalent during the sample period.  Instead, most
Czech facilities reportedly reduced emissions in the old-fashioned way: they installed end-of-pipe
treatmenttechnologies. Thus,theroleofnewproductiontechnologies appears limited.  In contrast,
the role of regulatory scrutiny seems larger.  Unlike in Communist times, the Czech Inspection,32
which is responsible for monitoring for and enforcing against non-compliance with air protection
laws, performed many inspections and imposed many fines during the sample period.  For example,
in 1997, the Czech Inspection performed 13,455 inspections and imposed 1,952 fines, in addition
to closing 36 facilities due to noncompliance, as reported in the agency’s annual yearbook.  Similar
to the cost of regulatory scrutiny and regulatory sanctions, local community pressure was tangible
in this period, as expressed through numerous citizen complaints, which are filed with the Czech
Inspection (Earnhart, 2000).  For example, in 1997, the Czech Inspection received over 700 citizen
complaints.  Unlike regulatory and commmunity pressure, the threat of third-party lawsuits was
trivial in the Czech Republic during this period (Earnhart, 1998).
As yet another interpretation of the negative effect on costs, the noted finding supports the
conjecture that better environmental performance lowers financing costs.  While possible, this
interpretation is not plausible for the Czech Republic during the sample period given the lack of any
corroborating evidence.  Lastly, the noted finding supports the conjecture that better environmental
performance lowers labor costs by improving work conditions with reductions in internal/external
or fugitive emissions.  As explained in sub-section 2.1, improved work conditions increase labor
productivity and/or decrease workers’ compensation claims and litigation costs.  Given the rather
filthy conditions in some Czech firms during the sample period, a meaningful increase in labor
productivity seems quite plausible.  Consistent with this claim, labor productivity improved
dramatically over the sample period (Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002). However, we are aware of no
study that connects reductions in fugitive emissions to improved labor productivity in the Czech
Republic.  Thus, this claimedconnection remainsunsubstantiated. Unlike the potential importance
of labor productivity increases, any reduction in workers’ compensation claims and litigation costs33
was most likely mitigated by the government’s comprehensivecoverage of medical services and the
general absence of litigation over “environmental” matters (Earnhart, 1998).
Based on this discussion, of the supported conjectures (i.e., interpretations), the most
plausible is the combination of regulatory and community pressure: reductions in air emissions
lowered Czech firms’ costs by removing regulatory scrutiny and community pressure and eliminating
the imposition of regulatory sanctions.
In contrast, the noted finding rejects the conjecture that complex pollution-reducing devices
and processes reduce overall productive efficiency, which implies an increase in costs.
Third, the results of our study indicate that better environmental performance appears to
improve profitability by driving costs down more than revenues.  Profits represent the simple
difference between revenues and costs. Above we interpret the findings for revenues and costs
separately.  Thus, the remaining issue concerns the relative magnitudes of the effects on these two
profit components.  Thedeclinein costsexceedsthedeclinein revenues. A greater decrease in costs
is consistent with the meaningful benefits of reducing the otherwise substantial regulatory scrutiny
or at least reducing the uncertainty associated withpossible regulatory scrutiny.  As evidence of this
substantial regulatory scrutiny, several facilities were actually shut down in the CzechRepublic due
to noncompliance.  The benefits of reduced community pressure further substantiate the greater
decrease in costs, relative to the decline in revenues.
On the other side of the ledger, a lesser decrease in revenues is consistent with the traditional
end-of-pipe approach to pollution control taken by most Czech firms.  Use of these end-of-pipe
treatment technologies most likely did not constrain the production of revenue-enhancing production
to a great extent. This point notwithstanding, better environmental management, in some form, not34
necessarily end-of-pipe treatment, apparently constrained revenue enhancement to a significant
extent.
In sum, better environmental management appears linked to improved profitability and the
most likely cause is reduced regulatory and community pressure.
5. Summary
This paper examines the link from corporate environmental performance to financial
performance.  In particular, we assess whether better environmental performance alters sales,
revenues, or both.  Based on our analysis of Czech firms in the years 1996 to 1998, we conclude that
good environmental performance, in the form of lowerair pollutantemissions, appears to undermine
future revenues, while lowering costs to a greater extent, thus, improving profitability.  This
conclusion is highly robust to many alternative specifications.
As noted in the introduction, given the transitional nature oftheCzech economy, the results
ofthis study need not generalize to other economies, especially mature market economies.  To assess
this point, as ongoing research, we are examining the latter period of the Czech transition,
specifically, the period between 1999 and 2004, when the country entered the EU.  By examining
the expanded period from 1996 to 2004andcomparingthetwosub-periods,wewillbe able to assess
whether the evolution towards a market-based economy alters the relationship between
environmental and financial performance.35
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics






Table 1.b.  Means and Standard Deviations of Production, Ownership, and Emission Variables
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Production Value (000s CZK) 1,201,078 2,646,672
Emissions Total (tons) 866 3,728
State Ownership share (%) 5.69 15.73
Strategic Investor Ownership share (%) 28.40 30.33
Individual Citizens Ownership share (%) 4.92 15.22
Bank Ownership share (%) 1.00 5.62
Portfolio Company Ownership share (%) 1.97 8.44
Investment Funds Ownership share (%) 13.51 20.51
Foreign Ownership share (%) 7.16 19.84
Concentration: Single Largest Shareholder (%) 44.76 21.62
Note: CZK = Czech Crowns
1.c.  Means and Standard Deviations: Financial Performance and Firm Size
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
Profits (000s CZK) - 6,914 194,909
Operating Profits (000s CZK) 60,751 249,785
Costs (000s CZK) 1,238,092 2,717,239
Sales (000s CZK) 1,231,178 2,553,454
Total Assets (000s CZK) 1,546,258 3,183,106
Equity (000s CZK) 776,521 1,659,270
Note: CZK = Czech Crowns36
Table 1.d.   Distribution According To Industrial Classification
Industry Obs. Percent
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fisheries 8 0.79
Mining and Quarrying 13 1.23
Manufacturing of Food Products, Beverages, and Tobacco 165 15.76
Manufacturing of Textiles, Textile Products, Leather, and Leather Products 85 8.10
Manufacturing of Wood, Wood Products, Pulp, Paper, and Paper Products
     and Publishing and Printing 36 3.43
Manufacturing of Coke and Refined Petroleum 4 0.35
Manufacturing of Chemicals, Chemical Products, and Synthetic Fibers 46 4.40
Manufacturing of Rubber and Plastic Products 18 1.76
Manufacturing of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 80 7.66
Manufacturing of Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 135 12.94
Manufacturing of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 141 13.53
Manufacturing of Electrical and Optical Equipment 41 3.96
Manufacturing of Transport Equipment 73 7.04
Manufacturing: Other 32 3.08
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply 53 5.11
Construction 49 4.67
Wholesale and Retail Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles 3 0.26
Hotels and Restaurants 8 0.79
Transport, Postal Service, Storage, and Telecommunications 1 0.09
Finance, Real Estate, Rentals, Business, Research, Public Administration 30 2.90
Education, Health, and Veterinary Services 11 1.06
Other Public and Social Services 5 0.44
Other: Overall 7 0.65
Total 1,044 100.0037
Table 2
Fixed Effects Estimation of Financial Performance Measures
Table 2.a. Estimation of Costs and Profits
Variable Costs Profits
 a
























No. of Firms / No. of Obs 429 / 1044 429 / 1044
F-Test for Fixed Effects





Adjusted R 0.9957 0.7170
2
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted inside square brackets.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.
  Each regression also includes 429 firm-specific indicators, seven ownership share factors, an
a
ownership concentration factor, and an inverse Mills ratio for ownership data reporting.
Table 2.b. Effect of Lagged Pollutant Emissions on Sales:
Coefficient Recovered from Estimation Results for Costs and Profits
Variable Sales
Lagged Pollutant Emissions 8.463
(4.532)
*
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.38
Table 3










Firm Size = Equity














Production  (000,000 CZK)
2 N/A - 3.42 E-9
(0.74 E-9)
*** N/A





Total Assets  (000,000 CZK)
2 - 3.73 E-9
(0.56 E-9)
*** N/A N/A
Equity (000 CZK) N/A N/A 0.2105
(0.0228)
***
No. of Firms / No. of Obs 429 / 1044 429 / 1044 429 / 1044
F-Test for Fixed Effects







Adjusted R 0.7365 0.7267 0.9134
2
Standard errors are noted inside parentheses; p-values are noted inside square brackets.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively.
  Each regression also includes 429 firm-specific indicators, two year-specific indicators, seven
a
ownership share factors, an ownership concentration factor, and an inverse Mills ratio for
ownership data reporting.39
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